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Strategic interaction between public and private actors 
is increasingly recognized as an important determinant 
of agricultural market performance in Africa and 
elsewhere. Trust and consultation tend to positively 
affect private activity while uncertainty of government 
behavior impedes it. This paper reports on a laboratory 
experiment based on a stylized model of the Zambian 
maize market. The experiment facilitates a comparison 
between discretionary interventionism and a rules-based 
policy in which the government pre-commits itself to a 
future course of action. A simple precommitment rule 
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can, in theory, overcome the prevailing strategic dilemma 
by encouraging private sector participation. Although 
this result is also borne out in the economic experiment, 
the improvement in private sector activity is surprisingly 
small and not statistically significant due to irrationally 
cautious choices by experimental governments. 
Encouragingly, a rules-based policy promotes a much 
more stable market outcome, thereby substantially 
reducing the risk of severe food shortages. These results 
underscore the importance of predictable and transparent 
rules for the state’s involvement in agricultural markets. 
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Food prices and availability are highly politicized issues in the developing world, and there is a 
widespread view that governments are responsible for ensuring people’s access to food (Bratton 
and Mattes, 2003).  Political objectives are often pursued by influencing market outcomes.  Yet it 
is also increasingly recognized that markets must be strengthened to promote farm productivity 
growth and national food security, and that encouraging private sector activity is crucial to this 
process.  Herein lies the dilemma:  If government intervenes too little, it risks price fluctuations 
and other market outcomes that are politically and socially undesirable.  If government intervenes 
too frequently and unpredictably, it risks discouraging traders’ participation in markets.   
Resulting low private sector activity then forces the government to intervene in the market in 
order to achieve its social objectives.  To the extent that the private sector is more timely and 
efficient in its operations, this situation results in an efficiency loss.  However, much larger than 
these short-run efficiency losses are the inhibiting effects of uncertain government behavior on 
long-term private investment and the overall development of the marketing system (North, 1987; 
North, 1994).  Strategic interaction between the public and private sector is therefore an issue that 
fundamentally affects food security outcomes in these mixed marketing systems.   
 
In this environment, the performance of food markets is greatly affected by the way the private 
sector and the government interact.  In much of Africa, the market liberalization policies 
implemented since the late 1980s were marked by ostensible attempts to transfer critical 
marketing functions from the state to private traders, but in reality governments retained 
discretionary influence over prices and supplies (Jayne et al., 2002; Goldsmith, 2002).  In most 
cases, the liberalization process has been marred by lack of trust, cooperation and coordination 
between the private and public sectors.  These problems have contributed to the sluggish rural 
income growth and frequent food crises witnessed in Africa in recent decades.  
 
Traditional development economics typically analyzes the performance of food markets as the 
impact of shifting demand and supply curves.  This approach can be usefully complemented by 
an investigation of the strategic and behavioral aspects of the economic environment.  This paper 
introduces a novel approach to analyze strategic interaction between government and private 
traders in food markets, based on the case of Zambia.  A strategic market model was designed 
based on a variation of the Cournot-Stackelberg oligopoly model.  Economic parameters and 
variables were informed by real-world data wherever possible.  The strategic and behavioral 
implications of the model were tested in a controlled laboratory experiment.  A specific objective 
of the experiment was to compare the current government policy of discretionary interventionism 
with a rules-based policy in which the government precommits itself to a future course of action.  
The laboratory allows gathering of replicable data under conditions in which these two policy 
rules can be compared under exactly the same economic conditions - an endeavor that is 
impossible to carry out in the field.  By replicating the same environment the idiosyncratic 
variance inherent to human behavior can also be distilled.  Experimental sessions with the ‘real’ 
maize market players in Zambia were also conducted, including government officials and private 
  1sector participants.  These sessions were intended as a learning device to facilitate policy dialogue 
rather than to collect generalizable data. 
 
The experimental results show that trust and cooperation between government and private sector 
are difficult to sustain under a discretionary government policy.  Early attempts to cooperate soon 
break down, leading to low private sector activity.  Lack of coordination between the sectors is 
also prevalent, resulting in either in food shortages or losses to the private sector.  Surprisingly, 
private sector supply under the precommitment regime is only slightly and insignificantly higher.  
This behavioral phenomenon is termed the paranoia effect, which, to our knowledge, has not 
been reported in the experimental economics literature so far.  In theory, trust is required only in 
the ability and willingness of other market participants to act in their own interest.  Experimental 
governments, however, frequently fail to trust the private sector even to that extent, and behave 
uncooperatively as a result.  The data reveal that this mistrust is unwarranted, hence the term 
‘paranoia’ for this type of behavior.  The phenomenon stands in marked contrast to observations 
in previous trust game experiments (see, for instance, Camerer 2003), in which experimental 
participants, contrary to theoretical predictions, achieve high levels of trust. 
 
In the light of the theoretical superiority of the precommitment regime, its impact on private 
sector activity in the trials may seem disappointing.  Nevertheless, a rules-based policy still 
outperforms the discretionary regime on other accounts.  First, market outcomes are less erratic 
than under discretion, making food shortages or ruinous oversupply less likely.  Second, it is in 
the government’s hand to which strategy to precommit.  The data provide little reason not to go 
down the cooperative route.  In this sense, the results of the maize market experiment underscore 
the importance of predictable and transparent rules for governing the state’s involvement in 
markets, and how such operations in the market could reduce the risks of a food crisis and 
enhance economic efficiency. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 introduces the Zambian maize 
market context and highlights the difficulties of implementing market reforms such as the one 
advocated in this paper.  Section 3 introduces the model and experimental design.  Section 4 
presents the results of the main experiment with subjects drawn from outside the context of the 
Zambian maize market.  Section 5 discusses the outcome of the experiment in which Zambian 
government officials and private sector participants took part.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Political Economy of Maize Market Reform in Zambia 
 
The Government of Zambia adopted maize marketing reforms as part of loan conditionality 
agreements with the World Bank and IMF in the late 1980s while facing extreme fiscal pressure.  
However, starting in 1993 the government reversed some of these reforms and progressively re-
introduced a number of measures to control food prices and supplies.  By 1995, a new parastatal, 
the Food Reserve Agency (FRA), was formed to hold strategic food stocks.  Since the early 
2000s, the FRA has taken on many of the activities formerly carried out by the marketing board 
of the 1980s (Namboard), albeit on a smaller scale.  While private trade has developed steadily 
since the early 1990s, the current market environment is remarkably similar to that of the late 
1980s, when external donors were urging the government to curtail the activities of the grain 
  2marketing board, open up the borders to regional trade, and rely more on the private sector to 
carry out grain marketing and trade.  During the past five years, the Mwanawasa government has 
progressively introduced greater state intervention in food marketing and trade.   
 
Why have successive governments in Zambia, and elsewhere in the region, tended not to pursue 
the market reform and liberalization agenda recommended by international development 
agencies?
4  There are two possible explanations.  The first is that government objectives are 
varied, inherently political, and vulnerable to influence and capture by elites.  As argued by 
Lopez (2003), the allocation of public expenditures tends to be biased in favor of private goods, 
such as input subsidies, that can be captured by politically influential groups and against the 
provision of public goods that would improve the overall performance of markets and thus have 
broad-based benefits for the poor.  The political landscape in much of Africa can also be 
described as being dominated by neo-patrimonial relationships, in which government commodity 
distribution is an important tool by which leaders maintain loyalty and patronage among rural 
leaders and their constituents (van de Walle 2001; Bird et al 2003; Pletcher 2000).  
 
The second class of explanations, on which this study focuses, has to do with genuine 
government concern for the welfare of smallholders as well as urban dwellers.  White maize is 
the strategic political crop in this region of Africa.  Maize became the cornerstone of an implicit 
and sometimes explicit ‘social contract’ that the post-independence governments made with the 
African majority to redress the neglect of smallholder agriculture during the colonial period 
(Jayne and Jones 1997).  The controlled marketing systems inherited by the new African 
governments at independence were viewed as the ideal vehicle to implement this objective.  The 
benefits of market controls designed to produce rents for European farmers during the colonial 
period instilled the belief that the same system could also promote the welfare of millions of 
smallholders if it was simply expanded (Jenkins 1997). The social contract incorporated the 
understanding that governments were responsible for ensuring cheap food for the urban 
population.   
 
While the social contract approach achieved varying levels of success in promoting smallholder 
incomes and raising consumer welfare, a common result in all cases was an unsustainable drain 
on the treasury.
5  The cost of supporting smallholder production - through input subsidies, credit 
programs with low repayment rates, commodity pricing policies that subsidized transport costs 
for smallholders in remote areas, and the export of surpluses at a loss - contributed to fiscal 
deficits and, in some cases, macroeconomic instability.  Under increasing budget pressure, 
international lenders gained leverage over domestic agricultural policy starting in the 1980s, 
which culminated in structural adjustment programs (Jayne and Jones 1997).  While structural 
adjustment is commonly understood to be a decision that international lenders imposed on 
African governments, a more accurate characterization of the process is that this adjustment was 
unavoidable due to the mounting fiscal crises that the social contract policies were imposing on 
governments.  Continuation of the status quo policies was not an option in countries such as 
Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, and in some of these countries, the controlled 
                                                           
4 See Del Ninno et al (2005), Deininger and Olinto (2000), Jayne and Jones (1997), Jayne et al., (2002), Mwanaumo 
et al (1997), Siegel and Alwang (2005), World Bank (2003, 2004 and 2006) and World Bank and IFRPRI (2005).   
5 To illustrate, by the late 1980s, Zambia’s subsidies to the maize sector reached 17% of the national budget (Howard 
and Mungoma 1997). 
  3marketing systems had already broken down prior to ‘market liberalization’ as parallel markets 
swiftly became the preferred channel for most farmers and consumers.   
 
The rise of multi-party electoral processes in the early 1990s has, however, made it difficult for 
governments in these countries to withdraw from ‘social contract’ policies.  Elections can be won 
or lost through policy tools to reward some farmers with higher prices and reward consumers 
with lower prices, and this is hardly unique to developing countries (Bates 1981; Bates and 
Krueger 1993; Bratton and Mattes 2003; Sahley et al. 2005).  Because they provide obvious 
demonstrations of support for millions of small farmers and consumers, a retreat from the social 
contract policies exposes leaders to attack from opposition candidates (Sahley et al., 2005).  For 
this reason, it remains difficult for leaders to publicly embrace grain market and trade 
liberalization, even as they accepted structural adjustment loans under conditionality agreements 
from international donors to reform their internal and external markets.  And starting in the late 
1990s, the transition of the World Bank and other development partners from structural 
adjustment loans with ex-ante conditionality to direct budget support with ex-post conditionality 
made it easier for states to reinstate some elements of the social contract policies. 
 
By the early 2000s, grain marketing boards have once again become the dominant players in the 
market in Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Jayne et al, 2002).  Each of these countries 
have a highly unpredictable and discretionary approach to grain trade policy, commonly imposing 
sudden and unanticipated export and import bans, changes in import tariff rates, or issuing 
government tenders for the importation of subsidized grain. Problems frequently arise due to 
uncertainty about when and whether governments will alter import duties or import intentions in 
response to a short crop (e.g., Zambia in 2000/01, 2001/02; 2005/06; Malawi in 2001/02).   
Traders otherwise willing to mobilize imports early are likely to incur financial losses if the 
government later waives the duty and allows competing firms (or the government parastatal) to 
import more cheaply.  When governments create uncertainty over import intentions or tariff rates 
during a poor crop season, the result is commonly a temporary under-provision of imports, which 
can produce a situation of acute food shortages and price spikes far above the cost of import 
(Nijhoff et al, 2003; Mwanaumo et al, 2005; Tschirley et al, 2004).  Analysts not familiar with the 
details of these situations often erroneously interpret them as evidence that markets fail and that 
the private sector is weak, leading to a rationale for continued direct government involvement in 
marketing. 
 
The above illustrations highlight the importance of strategic interaction, in determining food 
security and improving market performance. Many analysts have concluded that predictable and 
transparent rules governing state involvement in the markets would reduce market risks, allow for 
greater coordination between private and public decisions in the market, and enable governments 
to more effectively achieve food security policy objectives (Kherallah et al. 2002, Jayne et al. 
2002, Mwanaumo et al. 2005, Byerlee, Myers, and Jayne 2006).  Generally, the conclusions 
mentioned above have not been tested in a rigorous manner.  In this paper we try to alleviate this 
deficiency by providing data gathered in a controlled laboratory experiment.  
 
One possible reason for the rarity of rules-based policies in the present context may be that they 
seem unconvincing, abstract or counterintuitive to policy makers. Note that the virtue of 
precommitment comes from the government’s deliberate act of tying its own hands, of reducing 
its own strategy space in order to improve its own payoff.  While game theory provides a plethora 
  4of situations in which this is a sensible act, decision makers unfamiliar with the formal analysis of 
strategic games may find it unnatural. Further, the constant re-shuffling of Ministers of 
Agriculture and Permanent Secretaries makes it difficult for them to invest enough time in 
understanding the agricultural sector and develop a greater evidence-based appreciation of the 
way the sector actually works. From their vantage point, they have not been in a position to see 
how the performance of markets may be influenced by their own actions.  An important purpose 
of the Zambia maize market policy experiment was therefore to provide first-hand experience, 
through participating in a simulated market game, of how government and trader behavior 




3. The Model and Experimental Design 
 
The design of the experimental model faced a number of challenges.  First, the model had to 
capture the most essential features of the Zambian maize market.  It was therefore informed by 
data from the actual market rather than artificial pay-offs.
6  Second, the model had to be 
sufficiently simple to be playable in a short experimental session.  (Note that these two goals are, 
to some extent, conflicting.)  Third, since the game was also designed as a learning tool, it had to 
be entertaining to play. 
 
3.1. The players 
The Zambian maize market has four principal economic agents: farmers, millers, traders and the 
government.  Farmers, who grow and harvest the crop, are mostly small family enterprises, many 
producing for subsistence.  Each farmer’s influence on market outcomes is small, so farmers are 
not modeled as strategic players.  Instead their production level is determined exogenously, 
predominantly by rainfall.  Millers buy the harvest and turn the maize into maize meal. They then 
sell the meal to consumers, who amongst others use it as the basis for nshima, the staple diet in 
Zambia.  Since they do not play a strategic role, millers are also omitted from the game. 
 
The remaining two types of agents, the traders and the government, are the key strategic players 
in the maize market game.  In a shortage year - the main focus of this paper - traders import 
maize from nearby countries, mainly South Africa, and sell it to millers.  The Zambian maize 
market is composed of about 1,000 small traders accounting for about 60 percent of the trading 
volume.  Four large trading companies (AFGRI, Amanita, Zdenakie, and CHC Traders) cover the 
remaining 40 percent of the market (Jayne et al. 2007).  Their trading volume is sufficiently high 
to exert market power, so they can be assumed to make their decisions strategically, taking the 
actions of the other players into account.  Traders are assumed to be profit-maximizers. 
 
                                                           
6 Experiments on games informed by real-world data are surprisingly rare.  Some have been carried out in the course 
of consulting projects for spectrum auctions, but their results are often not published due to confidentiality concerns 
of the clients (an exception is Abbink et al. (2002)).  In a different context, Güth, Kröger, and Maug (2003) 
parameterise a bargaining game with data from a case study on the film industry.  Abbink, Moller, and O’Hara 
(2006) study the conflict between the Central Asian countries sharing the Syr Darya river and estimate payoff 
functions from real-life data. 
  5Finally, the behavior of the government, through the Food Reserve Agency (FRA), strongly 
affects market outcomes.  In shortage years the FRA imports maize in competition with the 
private sector.  It can thus be interpreted as an additional big trader on the market.  In contrast to 
the private traders, the government is not a profit-maximizer, but is assumed to pursue a political 
agenda aimed at re-election.  To gain popular support from consumers the government prefers to 
keep consumer prices low.  On the other hand, since many households in Zambia are small maize 
farmers, the government also has an interest in high producer prices.  This set of goals essentially 
conflicts with that of traders as discussed later.   
 
3.2 The consumer market 
The core model is a Cournot oligopoly game.  In this model suppliers choose their quantities and 
the price is determined by the market.  The model is appropriate for a basic agricultural product 
with a high degree of product homogeneity.  Further, it has very natural predictions for the 
market outcome.  It reacts smoothly to small changes in the traders’ behavior, and changes in the 
competitive environment leads to the expected change in market outcome (e.g. an increase in the 
number of firms results in lower prices and profits).  These desirable properties have been 
reproduced empirically in a plethora of experimental studies (Huck, Normann and Oechssler 
1999, 2004, Huck, Müller, and Normann 2001, Offerman, Potters, and Sonnemans 2002).   
 
Traders face a downward-sloping demand function, where the consumer price, P
C, is a decreasing 
function of the total quantity supplied by the market.  For simplicity, a linear demand function is 




C = a – b(Q + G + S) (1) 
 
where  Q=Σqi is the total quantity supplied by the n traders, G is the government quantity and S is 
the baseline supply offered by small traders. Exogenous parameters a and b specify intercept and 
slope of the demand function, respectively.  As mentioned, the suppliers on the consumer market 
consist of four big traders and a large number of small traders.  The small traders are price takers 
with a capacity constraint (i.e. they do not import).  They jointly supply a fixed quantity S, which 
they sell irrespective of the market price, without strategic considerations. 
 
Each trader faces constant marginal costs, c.  For simplicity, marginal costs are assumed identical 
to the producer price (the price that the farmers receive), assuming other costs (notably transport 
costs) to be constant and thus not affecting optimal choices.  Note that this assumption implies 
that traders have the same cost structure, since the producer price is the same for all.
8 
                                                           
7 Empirical estimates often yield a relatively constant demand elasticity over the relevant range of market outcomes.  
This invites the use of a constant elasticity demand function of the form p=Q
η.  Estimations of such demand 
functions turned out to have very undesirable properties in a strategic market model.  In extreme cases they lead to 
corner equilibria, in which firms would optimally sell one grain of maize at an infinite price.  The reason is that one 
cannot expect the constant elasticity assumption to hold over the entire price range, including those prices not 
empirically observed.  In a strategic model, however, the unobserved range can affect the equilibria dramatically and 
this augers against the use of this functional form in the present context. 
8 Note that, although intuitive, this model of price determination of the maize market is an approximation.  In reality,  
the government announces consumer and producer prices at the start of the season and is at liberty to change this 
price later in the season or cease purchasing at any time depending on its rate of intake and in light of changes in 
market conditions. 
  6 
The discretionary policy case 
In the discretionary (baseline) model, traders and the government choose their quantities 
simultaneously after the government has made a non-binding announcement about its supply 
intention.  The total quantity is given by Σqi + G + S, where qi is the quantity chosen by trader i. 
By assumption, the big traders are not capacity constrained, i.e. they can import unlimited 
supplies.
9  Traders i’s profit is given as: 
 
πi = (P
C – c)qi  = (a - b(qi + Q-i + G + S) - c)qi (2) 
 
where Q-i denotes the total quantity provided by the traders less player i’s supply.  This is similar 
to the profit expression in a standard Cournot model except for government supply, G, and the 
bulk quantity S supplied by small traders. The market equilibrium can be obtained by maximizing 










c G S b a
qi  (3) 
 
Note that equation (3) contains the government’s best response G* which is endogenous. Since 
the government is not a profit maximizer, the equilibrium quantity can only be solved once the 
payoff function of the government has been specified. 
 
The case of policy pre-commitment 
In this variant of the game the government chooses its quantity before the traders.  The Cournot 
game of the discretionary case thus turns into a variation of a Stackelberg oligopoly model, with 
the government as the leader and the n traders as followers.  Equilibrium quantities are computed 
the same way as in the discretionary case.  However, since the government’s quantity is now 
known when traders make their decision, the market outcome may be different, as studied in 
more detail later. 
 
3.3. The demand function 
For both research and training purposes, it was important that the model’s parameters were not 
invented, but at least informed by real-world data. This increases the relevance of the 
experimental results, and made the game more recognizable as the Zambian maize market 
environment to the real players in the workshop experiment.  Efforts to generate real-life 
parameters, of course, find their limits in the availability of robust data.  In the current framework 
only very sparse data were available, so the market model developed here can claim neither 
statistical robustness nor a high level of accuracy.  On the other hand, given that the alternative 
was to assume arbitrary parameter values it was decided to proceed with parameter estimation.  
As explained in more detail in Annex A, the following demand function for bad weather years 
(i.e. a maize production of less than 700 kMT) was derived: 
 
                                                           
9 In Zambia, the issue of trader’s import capacity is a contentious one with government questioning whether the 
private sector has sufficient capacity and the private sector eager to demonstrate that it does.  
  7P
C = 436 – 0.99(Q+S)  (4)
 
 
where Q+S is the total quantity supplied jointly by large and small traders (excluding government 
supply).  This demand function was subsequently used as a basis for calculating trader payoffs in 
the experimental model. 
 
3.4. The government payoff function 
Government maize trading is not aimed at making a profit. Indeed, due to the comparatively 
higher operating costs it often takes place at a loss.  In this paper, the objectives of the 
government are assumed to be political in nature.  Food security and maize price stability are 
concerns frequently expressed by government officials.  Further, because Zambia is a multi-party 
democracy the ruling party is concerned about its chances of being re-elected, so it aims to 
increase popular support.  As previously discussed, the maize price is a crucial variable for voter 
satisfaction, because of the vital role maize plays in the staple diet.  Virtually all Zambians are 
consumers of maize.  High consumer prices are a likely cause of public dissent, so the 
government is interested in keeping consumer prices low.  At the same time the majority of 
Zambians are small farmers, where maize is the predominant crop.  These maize farmers benefit 
from high producer prices, so the government also has an interest in not letting producer prices 
drop too far.  The model abstracts from all other goals the government may have.
10  
 
Any estimation about the relative weight of the government’s two price objectives can naturally 
only be guesswork, since hard data on governments’ payoff functions are inherently absent.  The 
model thus uses a payoff function that is linearly decreasing in the consumer price, P
C, and 
linearly increasing in the producer price (i.e. the marginal cost of traders, c).  In lack of qualified 
data the natural prior, that both goals have equal weight, was used.  Finally, to capture the fact 
that government imports are generally carried out at a higher cost relative to private sector 
imports, it is assumed that there is a constant cost to each metric ton of maize supplied by the 
government, k.
11  Government payoff is thus given by: 
 
u = c – P
C– kG  (5) 
 
Note that the government’s goals conflict with the interests of the traders, since the difference 
between producer and consumer prices is essentially the traders’ profit margin, c.f. equation (2). 
 
In reality, the Zambian government has a wide range of maize marketing policy instruments at its 
disposal.  For example, it can influence market outcomes by setting import tariffs, granting export 
licenses or banning exports altogether.  This paper, however, focuses only on direct FRA activity 
as a buyer and seller of maize.  In a shortage year the government’s main activity is to import 
maize from neighboring countries to ensure adequate domestic supply.  It also buys some 
quantity from the domestic market for the strategic food reserve. 
 
                                                           
10 Other relevant government objectives in this context include, for example, development and modernization of the 
food marketing system, reducing the treasury costs of grain marketing operations, and price stabilization. 
11 The assumption k>0 is critical for the results of the paper.  It captures the fact that the private sector has a cost 
advantage over government in importing maize.  Economic efficiency therefore increases in private sector imports.  
This assumption is widely believed to be true for Zambia, according to most market observers. 
  8All other things equal, increased government imports lower the consumer price, since it increases 
total supply.  Since the government also buys some maize from the domestic producers, it 
increases the demand for domestically produced maize, and hence exerts an upward pressure on 
producer prices.  In a shortage year this effect is relatively small, since the excess demand must 
be filled with imports and domestic contributions to the strategic food reserve play a small role.   
 
3.5 Adaptations of the model to the experiment 
The real Zambian maize market has four big traders.  However, with four suppliers the game 
would have been hard to present transparently to experimental participants.  Moreover, the 
principal analytical interest is the strategic interaction between government and traders rather 
than interaction between traders.  For those reasons, the number of traders was reduced to two.
12  
By reducing the number of active traders the competitiveness of the real market is understated.  
However, it turns out that the main characteristics of the market, mainly with respect to the 
strategic environment, remain preserved. 
 
The strategy space was also reduced in order to make the payoffs presentable in tables.  Traders 
therefore have only four options.  They can each choose quantities of 20, 40, 60, or 80 kMT.  The 
government’s options are reduced even further.  It can either supply a low quantity (of zero kMT) 
or a high quantity (assumed to be 80 kMT).  With the reduction of the strategy space of players it 
is now possible to represent the game using relatively compact payoff tables (see table 1). The 
government’s payoff depends on its own choice and the aggregate quantity supplied by the two 
traders. Thus, one table is sufficient to display the government’s possible payoffs. Since the 
government’s choices was restricted to two (either a high or a low quantity), the traders have to 
take two different payoff tables into account, one for each of the government’s possible choices.
13  
 
Finally, the effect of government supply on domestic producer prices also needs to be taken into 
account.  The government must buy its supply from the market first.  As mentioned, in a shortage 
year this effect is not supposed to be large, since most of the maize the government sells is 
imported.  It is therefore assumed that in a high government supply case producer prices are only 
10 percent higher than in the low quantity case.  This figure is well within the empirical range of 
observed prices.  
 
                                                           
12 The calibrations of the demand function continue to assume a four-trader market, since this corresponds to the real-
life constellation (see Appendix A). 
13 It may seem very restrictive to let the government choose only between two rather extreme alternatives.  However, 
the game theoretic analysis will show that the fundamental characteristics of the game do not get lost.  For the 
government higher quantities are always better than lower ones, while for the social optimum the lowest government 
quantity would be preferable.  
  9Table 1. The payoff tables 
A Trader’s payoff if the Government chooses a LOW quantity  
 
The other trader’s quantity   
20 40 60 80 
2763   2367  1971  1575   
20 
  2763   4733  5912  6299 
4733   3941  3149  2357   
40 
  2367   3941  4724  4715 
5912   4724  3536  2348   
60 
  1971   3149  3536  3131 


















  1575   2357  2348  1547 
 




A Trader’s payoff if the Government chooses a HIGH quantity  
 
The other trader’s quantity   
20 40 60 80 
614  218  -178  -574  
20 
  614  436  -534   -2296 
436  -356   -1148    -1940   
40 
  218  -356   -1722    -3880 
-534   -1722  -2910  -4098  
60 
  -178   -1148  -2910  -5464 


















  -574   -1940  -4098  -7048 
 




The Government’s payoff 
 
The traders’ TOTAL quantity  Government’s 
quantity  40  60  80  100 120 140 160 
Low  913  1111 1309 1507 1705 1903 2101 
High  1528 1726 1924 2122 2320 2518 2716 
  
  10The reduction of the market from a tetraopoly to a duopoly facilitated a presentation of the game 
in bimatrix form, as it is tradition in game theory.  Of course few experimental subjects and 
virtually none of workshop participants were trained in game theory and are thus unfamiliar with 
bimatrix games.  The bimatrix representation often looks unintuitive and confusing to game-
theoretic laymen.  All payoff tables were therefore printed in color, marking all choices and 
payoffs for one trader in red and for the other in blue.  Color-coding turns the bimatrix into a 
more transparent and simpler representation of a game. 
 
3.6 Game-theoretic analysis 
The game-theoretic analysis of the two variants is straightforward.  Consider the discretionary 
policy variant.  In stage 1, government announces its intended quantity.  In stage 2, the 
government and traders decide simultaneously on the quantity that they supply.  Note that the 
government announcement at stage 1 of the discretionary game is ‘cheap talk’ and will not affect 
the game theoretic prediction.  From table 1, it is observed that the government’s dominant 
strategy is to supply a high quantity, as its payoff is always higher regardless of what the traders 
do.  The traders foresee this and only take the payoff table for the government’s high choice into 
account.  In this case each trader has a dominant strategy to choose the lowest possible quantity 
of 20.  The corresponding Nash equilibrium payoffs are (u; π1; π2) = (1,528; 614; 614) for the 
government and the two traders. 
 
The Nash equilibrium, however, is a Pareto-inferior allocation.  To realize this, suppose that the 
government can credibly commit itself to choosing a low quantity.  The mutual best response 
occurs if each trader submits a quantity of 60.  In this allocation the corresponding payoffs are (u; 
π1; π2) = (1,705; 3,536; 3,536).  This represents a Pareto improvement since both government and 
private sector are better off.  However, in the discretionary variant the government cannot 
credibly make such a promise, as both traders know that once the decision stage is reached, a 
rational government will play its dominant strategy of ‘high’. 
 
A rules-based policy can overcome this strategic dilemma.  In the precommitment treatment the 
government is a Stackelberg leader and it makes a binding decision before the traders make 
theirs, thus the traders know what the government will do.  The subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the game, which is now derived by backward induction, is identified as follows. If the 
government chooses a high quantity, then the traders choose 20 each, and the government 
receives 1,528 just like in the equilibrium of the discretionary game.  If the government chooses a 
low quantity, then the traders respond with choosing 60 each, which leads to a government payoff 
of 1,705.  Thus, the government’s best strategy is to commit to a low quantity. 
 
3.7 The conduct of the main experiment 
The experiment was first conducted with 96 volunteer participants from the University of 
Amsterdam.  It was run as a pen-and-paper experiment in a classroom.  A computerized setup 
was not used for two reasons.  First, to maintain parallelism with the workshop experiment.  
Second, to enable a re-run of the exact same set-up in other Southern African countries in future 
studies.  In these countries computerized laboratories, which are the norm in most standard 
university experiments, are virtually non-existent.  
 
Each subject was allowed to participate in one session only, and no subject had participated in 
experiments similar to the present one.  The subjects were undergraduate students from a wide 
  11range of disciplines, with a balanced gender distribution.  The experiment was conducted in 
English, which is the language of instruction for most students in Amsterdam.  The subject pool 
was very international, with only a relative majority of Dutch citizens.  
 
In each session between four and six experimental markets were run in parallel.  Subjects 
interacted in fixed groups of three subjects.  Subjects were not told who of the other participants 
were in the same market, but they knew that the composition of the markets did not change 
during the experiment.  Subject roles (government/trader) were also held constant.  The subjects 
were seated distantly from one another in order to ensure that they could not influence each 
other’s behavior except through their decisions in the game. 
 
The players’ decisions were communicated using decision sheets and results sheets.  At each 
stage of the game subjects filled in a decision sheet.  If one role was inactive at one stage of the 
game, the relevant players were given a ‘dummy sheet’ asking for their expectations of the other 
players’ behavior.  These sheets were administered to avoid revealing the roles of participants 
which would have been the case if sheets were distributed to a subset of participants only.  The 
dummy sheets were not used to collect any data. 
 
Six rounds of the game were played in each two-hour session, representing six years of the 
Zambian maize market.  This is a slightly longer time horizon than an election term in Zambia 
where the President is elected for a five-year term.  Longer play allows learning and stabilization 
of behavior.  However, a length of dozens of rounds, as common in computerized experiments, 
was not possible in the pen-and-paper set-up and was also unrealistic, given that decision makers 
in the Zambian government frequently change.
14 
 
At the outset of the experiment, a capital balance of 2,000 talers (the experimental currency) was 
granted to each subject, to account for possible losses.  The total earnings of a subject from 
participating in this experiment were equal to this balance plus the sum of all the profits made 
during the experiment, minus all losses.  A session lasted for about two hours, including the time 
spent to read the instructions (reproduced in Appendix B).  At the end of the experiment, subjects 
were paid their total earnings anonymously in cash, at a conversion rate of one Euro for 1,500 
talers.  A show-up fee of  €5 was given to each subject showing up on time.  Subjects earned 
considerably more than students’ regular wage in Amsterdam.  At the time of the experiment, the 
exchange rate to other major currencies was approximately US$1.30 and £0.70 for one Euro. 
 
Three sessions were conducted in each of the two treatments.  Since participants did not interact 
except within their own market, each market can be considered a statistically independent 
observation.  In total, 16 independent observations were gathered in each treatment. 
                                                           
14 To illustrate, the Minister of Agriculture, who participated in the workshop, came into office only in October 2006, 
half a year before the event. 
  124. Results of the Main Experiment 
 
The central purpose of the main experiment was to test different policy options for the Zambian 
maize market with robust replicable data.  The game theoretic analysis of the model suggests the 
rules-based policy, in which the government precommits to its decisions, to be strongly superior 
to the discretionary regime.  However, whether this advice is empirically valid is another matter.  
The theoretical inferiority of the discretionary policy stems from the social dilemma, i.e. the 
conflict between individual and social rationality, present in the maize market.  Numerous 
experimental studies, however, have shown that subjects are frequently able to overcome such 
dilemmas and reach stable optimal outcomes through trust and reciprocity (e.g. Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
(2000), Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2000), Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Gächter and Falk 
(2002); for an experiment in an African context see Haile, Sadrieh, and Verbon (2006)).   
 
4.1. The discretionary treatment 
In the discretionary game government players have a strong incentive to choose a high quantity 
because it is the dominant strategy.  In order to reach a Pareto-superior cooperative arrangement, 
traders must trust that the governments can resist this temptation.  At the same time the 
government also needs to trust the traders.  If traders supply low quantities, then the 
government’s payoff is very small if it also chooses low – an outcome corresponding to a food 
shortage situation.   
 
Figure 1 shows the average total quantity supplied by the traders (left axis) and the percentage of 
high choices by the government (right axis).  The figure illustrates that cooperation is frequently 
attempted in early rounds, but it is very short-lived.  Over time, high choices from the 
government become increasingly dominant.  By the end of the experiment, cooperation collapsed 
in all but one market.  In accordance with the rising frequency of high choices, quantities 
supplied by the traders decrease from the third round onwards.  There is some evidence to suggest 
that it is the governments which first cease to cooperate and that the traders respond to this.  In 
the disaggregated data, however, no predominant response pattern is evident.
15 
                                                           
15 In 13 of the 16 markets high frequencies rise from the first to the second half of the game, whereas in the 
remaining three markets this frequency remains unchanged.  The binomial test rejects the null hypothesis of equal 
likelihood of rising and falling frequencies at p=0.0001 (one-sided).  Trader quantities fall in 10 of the 12 markets in 
which there is a change and this fall is significant (p=0.0193, one-sided). In the six rounds of play trader quantities do 
not fully converge to the noncooperative equilibrium, but the trend points toward that outcome.  Notably government 
high frequencies rise from the third round on; trader quantities typically follow with a one-round lag. 
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Before government and traders choose their quantities, the government sends a non-binding 
signal to the traders, indicating which quantity it intends to choose.  The government can use this 
signal to encourage traders to supply high quantities, if it announces that it will itself choose low.  
However, it can also use the messaging device to send a misleading signal, i.e. to lure the traders 
into believing the government would choose a low quantity, while it indeed intends to choose a 
high one.  Some observers believe that the Zambian government has occasionally made such 
misleading announcements, and in fact the strategic environment seems conducive to this 
behavior.  Table 2 shows the distribution of the four possible combinations of announcement and 
actual choice.  In 36 of 96 rounds (37.5 percent) the government chooses high after announcing 
low.  In comparison, a misleading signal in the opposite direction (choosing low after indicating 
high) was made only once.   
 
Table 2.  Government quantity: Announced vs. implemented 
 Announced 
Implemented Low  High  Total 
Low 38  1  39 
High 36  21  57 
Total 74  22  96 
 
 
4.2. The precommitment treatment 
In the precommitment treatment, the strategy dilemma between rational own-payoff 
maximization and social efficiency concerns is absent.  The sub-game perfect equilibrium is for 
the government to choose the low quantity, since it knows that it is in the traders’ best interest to 
supply high quantities themselves.  It would therefore be expected that that precommitment 
improves market efficiency.  Looking at the overall picture, however, the improvement is 
surprisingly small.  Average total trader quantity rises only slightly from 74.4kMT to 79.2kMT.  
  14The frequency of government high choices decreases from 58.3 percent to 49.0 percent, but these 
differences are statistically insignificant.
16 
 
Two factors explain this phenomenon.  First, the overall figures mask the strong deterioration in 
cooperation that is present in the discretionary treatment, but not in the precommitment treatment 
(see figure 2).  In earlier rounds players make an effort to cooperate in the discretionary 
treatment, but cooperation eventually breaks down.  Taking the second half of the experiment 
only (the last three rounds), a statistically significant difference is observed in government choice 
















































Second, the unexpectedly poor overall performance of the precommitment regime can be traced 
back to a phenomenon that is termed the paranoia effect.  Recall that governments move first and 
traders second.  When governments choose a low quantity, they must rely on the traders 
responding with high output levels, otherwise governments can be severely hurt by the resulting 
food shortage.  Governments need only to rely on the traders to act in their own best self interest, 
thus one would not expect the exposure to this risk to be very high.  Nevertheless, figure 3 shows 
that in almost half of the rounds government refrained from choosing the efficient quantity (120 
kMT), arguably out of fear to be hurt.
18  Such fears could be based in lack of confidence in the 
rationality of the trader players or fear that these will act spitefully. 
                                                           
16 Fisher’s two-sample permutation test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal trader quantities and equal 
government choices at any conventional significance level.   
17 Fisher’s two-sample randomization test rejects the null hypothesis of equal frequencies of government High 
choices at p=0.015 (one-sided).  The analogous comparison for trader quantities is not significant (one-sided, 
p=0.30).   
18 An alternative explanation could be that these subjects have a strong dislike of disadvantageous inequity.  In the 
efficient equilibrium traders earn more than the government, while in the inefficient allocation the government earns 
more.  However, most standard inequity aversion theories (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) assume that individuals 
dislike inequity even if it is in their favor.  The frequent occurrence of paranoid choices in the present experiment is 
unlikely to be explained by inequality aversion alone. 
  15The question arises whether the governments’ fear is warranted.  In other words, did the trader 
players behave irrationally or spitefully in ways that reduced government payoff?  The data 
reveals that this was not the case.  Figure 3 shows the distribution of total quantities conditional 
on the government’s choice in the precommitment treatment.  In the majority of cases traders 
responded to a government’s low quantity choice with the equilibrium quantity of 120 and 
sometimes even 140 was achieved.  These quantities are preferable to the government over the 
payoff the government obtains when choosing high (in which case virtually all traders respond 
with choosing 20 each).  Only in about one-fifth of all rounds did the traders supply a total of 
100.  This allocation is only marginally worse for the government than the high quantity outcome 
yielding a payoff of 1,507 instead of 1,528.  Thus, the fear of exposure that many experimental 
governments apparently had was actually unfounded. 
 
Figure 3. Precommitment Policy:  
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4.3. Policy conclusions arising from the data 
Though the experiment consisted of only two treatments, there are in fact three distinct policy 
options available to the government.  If the government chooses to establish a rules-based regime, 
it must also specify the rule to follow.  In addition to the discretionary regime, therefore, there are 
two options in the precommitment treatment: commitment to a high quantity and commitment to 
a low quantity. 
 
One rationale behind the policy of committing to a low government supply is that it may 
encourage private sector activity and hence raise economic efficiency.  Figure 4 illustrates that 
this goal is largely achieved.  The figure shows traders’ average total quantity for the three 
available policy regimes, over the six rounds of the experiment.  Precommitment to a low 
government supply induces the highest supply from the traders.  A discretionary policy induces a 
lower trader supply which declines from round 3 onwards.  Finally, precommitment to a high 
government quantity lead traders to respond with the lowest quantity. 
  16 
































Table 3 shows a range of market performance measures under alternative policy scenarios.
19 An 
almost complete crowding out of the private sector is observed if the government precommits to a 
high quantity compared to when it precommits to a low quantity.  Since the private sector is more 
cost-effective in supplying maize to the market than government, economic efficiency is highest 
in the ‘precommitment low’ regime. 
 
Table 3. Market Outcomes under Alternative Government Policy Regimes (Averages). 






























  S.D. denotes Standard Deviation. 
 
Total quantities are, on average, very similar in the three regimes (around 120 kMT), although in 
this experiment the two government choices are at the rather extreme ends of the scale (0 kMT 
vs. 80 kMT).  There are, however, substantial differences in the fluctuations around the mean 
values.  The standard deviation of a discretionary policy is twice as large as when governments 
precommit to a low supply and four times larger than when it precommits to a high supply.  
These fluctuations reflect the degree to which the two sectors are able to solve the underlying 
coordination problem.   
 
When governments commit to a high supply this leaves the private sector in little doubt that its 
best response is to provide relatively low supplies.
20  At the other extreme, under a discretionary 
policy the private sector is left in a limbo of what action the government may take.  This 
                                                           
19 These figures do not include the bulk supply from the small traders, which is held constant. 
20 In fact, the entire variance observed in the experiment was due to a single, possibly erroneous, decision. 
  17uncertainty causes frequent occurrences of over-shooting where both types of agents supply high 
quantities simultaneously, which drastically reduces trader profit.  More importantly, there are 
also a substantial number of ‘crises years’ where all agents under-supply.  With policy discretion, 
almost one-fifth of all years result in a total supply of less than 100 kMT – an outcome virtually 
nonexistent under a policy of precommitment.  The intermediate case, precommitment to a low 
quantity, represents a substantial improvement in reducing market fluctuations, although not as 
much as ‘precommitment high’ due to the Paranoia effect.  The objective of food security (or 




In sum, the most attractive policy regime, across a broad range of objectives, is that of 
government precommitment to a low quantity.  On average, it results in the most efficient market 
outcome, yields the highest trader profits and government payoffs and represents a substantial 
reduction in market fluctuations.  Nevertheless, a government which places a substantial value on 
the food security objective over other objectives may want to opt for a precommitment to a high 
quantity. 
 



























5. The Workshop Experiment 
 
In addition to the main experiment with student subjects, the same experiment was also 
conducted with participants from the real maize market in Zambia.  This happened in the context 
of the Zambia Maize Market Policy Dialogue which was a one-day workshop attended by 20 
high-level government officials and private sector maize market players (traders, millers and 
                                                           
21 An adequate food supply is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for food security, since the latter depends on 
appropriate distribution of the total supply between individuals. 
  18farmers).  Government representation included the Minister and a Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and representatives of the Food Reserve Agency.  The 
private sector was represented by inter alia the Chief Executives of the Grain Trader’s 
Association, the Miller’s Association of Zambia and the Zambia National Farmers Union.  
 
The experiment was conducted as one of the first events of the workshop, immediately after the 
official opening remarks and introductory comments. Care was taken that no substantial 
information about the nature of the experiment was passed to participants beforehand, and that 
the introductory comments only made vague statements about what was to follow. The 
instructions were then read aloud. The participants were given the additional information that the 
game was designed using Zambian maize market data and that it represented a shortage year, 




A few modifications had been applied to the game compared to the main experiment with student 
subjects.  One important change was that each player in the game was represented by teams of 
three to four participants, while the student subjects played individually. Individual play is 
effective in data gathering, but is less suitable for training purposes.  It was important for a 
successful workshop outcome that the game was entertaining to play, and individual play sessions 
with their long inactive phases can be quite tedious for participants.  Further, the workshop was 
intended to stimulate a dialogue between the different sides of the market.  The team discussions 
naturally inspired a lot of debate during and after the game. 
 
During play, teams were seated in separate rooms, where they could discuss their decisions 
without influencing or being influenced by discussions of other teams.  Each group had a 
facilitator to assist the group in answering questions and to remind them towards focusing on the 
facts of the game itself as opposed to the more complex reality that the real players may refer to 
when making decisions. 
 
The experiment simulated two parallel maize markets.  Each participant was randomly assigned 
to a team.  As a consequence, the participants did not necessarily play the role that they play in 
reality.  The Minister of Agriculture, for instance, played in a trader group.  Group composition 
was often mixed with representation from both sides of the market.  It turned out that this feature 
was very useful for the purpose of the workshop, since it enabled participants to experience the 
game from different perspectives, either by own experience or discussion with a team-mate from 
a different camp. 
 
Due to intense discussions within the teams the workshop experiment proceeded slower than the 
student sessions.  Nevertheless, the teams managed to play three rounds of the discretionary 
variant and two rounds of the pre-commitment treatment within 2½ hours.  In contrast to the 
students workshop participants played both treatments. 
                                                           
22 Note that in the 2005/06 season preceding the workshop rainfall conditions had been excellent and a bumper 
harvest was expected (though minor flooding had occurred in some areas).  In such circumstances, the policy issues 
in Zambia are quite different from those occurring when a bad harvest is expected, including e.g. concerns from 
trader’s regarding the government’s export policy.  Without this information, therefore, participants may have been 
confused. 
  19 
Workshop participants were not incentivized with monetary payoffs due to ethical considerations.  
The concern was that handing out prizes to government and business representatives at a 
workshop aimed at improving food security in a poor country could have adverse reputational 
effects for all parties involved (monetary prizes are commonplace in experimental economics, but 
experiments are unusual in the given context).  As a substitute, the best government and the best 
two trader teams received symbolic prizes in the form of certificates recognizing outstanding 
performance at the workshop.
23  Despite the lack of a proper proportional incentivizing 
mechanism, intrinsic motivation proved high and debates in the teams were lively. 
 
Due to the limited number of observations (only two markets and five rounds) it is not possible to 
generalize the outcome of the workshop experiment.  The results should therefore be regarded as 
anecdotal.  The two markets had substantially different outcomes.  Market 1 had a government 
intend on cooperation with players who quickly identified the optimal outcome (low government 
imports and high private sector imports).  In fact, this government identified this strategy already 
after the first round (though it sent confusing signals to the traders) and cooperation quickly 
evolved.  This market behaved more efficiently than a typical market in the main experiment. 
Market 2, in contrast, exhibited characteristics which were much less cooperative than in the 
main experiment.  According to statements made by the subjects after the experiment, the 
government players deliberately tried to punish traders by announcing low, but implementing 
high, maize imports. Moreover, the traders were relatively slow in responding to the 
government’s malevolent strategy.  This resulted in a total negative payoff for both traders 
(effectively they went bankrupt).  The results of the workshop experiment are presented in 
Appendix C.  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Discretionary and unpredictable government intervention is one of the greatest policy problems 
plaguing the food marketing systems and food security in the Southern Africa region.  This is 
because actual and potential government interventions generate private sector uncertainties and 
inaction leading to additional government intervention needs.  This problem has underlain 
virtually all of the recent food crises in Zambia and Malawi since 2000, where food supplies have 
dwindled and prices surged above the cost of importing it.  This study explored how erratic and 
unpredictable government behavior arises from a strategic dilemma between the private sector 
and a government concerned about food security and price stability.  A laboratory experiment 
was introduced, testing the strategic and behavioral implications of the present maize market 
environment, and comparing the current discretionary regime with a rules-based policy 
recommended by many observers.  
 
The results of the maize market experiment underpin a policy recommendation of introducing a 
rules-based policy, taken all aspects of our data together.  Effective coordination between the 
                                                           
23 Paying cash proportional to success, as usual, would have looked bad.  One possibility was to award desirable but 
not too extravagant material prizes, such as portable music players or digital cameras, and make each participant’s 
probability of winning proportional to their points earned.  This would have been theoretically sound.  For the 
symbolic prizes, however, playing out the lotteries would have time-consuming and irrelevant. 
  20private and public sector would require greater consultation and transparency with regard to 
changes in parastatal purchase and sale prices, as well as import and export decisions. In this 
study, a simple pre-commitment rule was found to be superior to discretionary policy making by 
reducing the risk of food crises and providing appropriate incentives for private actors to 
participate in the market thereby enhancing economic efficiency.  More specifically, it was found 
that total maize quantities and market prices are quite similar under the two different policy 
modes.  Importantly, however, situations of food shortage (and over-supply) were much more 
frequent under a discretionary policy because of the risk of poor coordination between the 
government and the private sector.  Government pre-commitment to a low quantity resulted in 
substantially higher trader profits because of the larger volume traded by them.  The Government 
of Zambia may therefore want to consider mechanisms which can help make maize market policy 
more predictable or rules-based in the future. 
 
That said, our data suggest that the efficiency gain from the switch to the precommitment 
treatment was, on average, only slight and insignificant.  When changing to a rules-based policy 
the government must also make sure to choose an effective rule to which to commit.  In the 
experiment many governments failed to do so, choosing non-cooperative policies that led to 
suboptimal outcomes.  This behavior can be traced back to what we have coined the paranoia 
effect, which describes irrationally cautious conduct out of fear of being hurt.  In the trials this 
fear has proven to be unwarranted, since traders responded to cooperative moves with own 
cooperation, which was, after all, in their own best interest and required no sacrifices from them.  
This paranoia effect is, to our knowledge, a novelty in the experimental economics literature, 
which boasts a multitude of studies in which people cooperate though rationally they should not.  
In our data, it is selfishly rational to cooperate, but subjects frequently do not. Thus our 
experiment, though designed as an application, may be of some interest to experimentalists 
involved in more fundamental behavioral research.  Further work is needed to explore whether 
the effect observed is specific to the present market environment, or whether it is a more general 
anomaly that can be identified in other experimental games as well. 
 
The paranoia effect observed in our data underlines how fragile the present environment is with 
respect to trust and cooperation, and this may partly explain the reluctance risk-averse 
governments in Zambia and elsewhere have shown to adopt such policies.  After all, this would 
not be the first time that policy makers have been encouraged to reform maize marketing policy 
by introducing higher degrees of transparency, predictability and cooperation towards the private 
sector, yet policy makers have thus far been reluctant in adopting such recommendations.  An 
important reason, as explained in the paper, is the predominance of neo-patrimonial relationships 
in which national leaders maintain loyalty and patronage among rural leaders through commodity 
distribution. A second explanation is that market controls enable governments to adhere to a 
‘social contract’ in which it supports smallholder agriculture while simultaneously ensuring cheap 
food for the urban population.  For those same reasons, the policy recommendations presented in 
this paper should not be expected to be adopted overnight.  
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  24Appendix A. Calibration of the Demand Function 
 
Table 1 contains the data used to calibrate the demand function.  Total quantity traded (column 6) 
and the observed prices (column 7) are particularly relevant. 
 
Table A.1. Annual maize supply and price estimates in Zambia, 1994-2006. 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 





























1994 good  1,020  357.0  300  657  150  1.00  657 
1995 moderate  737  184.3  200  384  208  1.05  368 
1996 excellent  1,409  563.6  350  914  127  1.09  837 
1997 moderate  960  240.0  300  540  173  1.14  473 
1998 Bad  638  127.6  100  228  183  1.19  191 
1999 moderate  822  205.5  300  506  135  1.25  406 
2000 moderate  881  220.3  300  520  116  1.30  399 
2001 Bad  601  120.2  150  270  192  1.36  199 
2002 Bad  620  124.0  150  274  244  1.42  193 
2003 good  1,161  406.4  300  706  169  1.49  475 
2004 good  1,113  389.6  300  690  150  1.55  444 
2005 Bad  866  216.5  300  517  236  1.62  318 
2006 excellent  1,400  560.0  350  910  140  1.70  537 
Note: Weather is classified according to the maize production, x: Bad: x≤700. Moderate: 700<x≤1,000. Good: 
1,000<x≤1,300. Excellent: x>1,300.  Column (7) is the mean of 12 month marketing period (May-April). 
Sources: Columns 3 and 4: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO) Annual Post-Harvest data. Column 7: 
Agricultural Market Information Centre, MACO. Column 8: Central Statistical Office: 1990 and 2000 census. 
 
It would be unrealistic to expect that all parameters of the market environment remained constant 
over the 13-year period for which data was available.  First, traded quantities have generally risen 
over this period due to urbanization.  Maize production that is consumed by subsistence farmers 
would not be recorded in official data.  Urban migration therefore increases the traded quantity 
recorded in table 1 even though the underlying demand remains unchanged. Total quantity 
(column 7) was therefore adjusted using an urbanization index (column 8) and the adjusted values 
(column 9) were used to calibrate the demand function. 
 
Secondly, demand for maize is not independent of the harvest. In principle, consumer demand is 
determined by exogenously determined consumer preferences and opportunity cost, which should 
not be strongly affected by the weather. However, in Zambia large quantities of maize are grown 
for subsistence. In good weather years small farmers produce for their own consumption and sell 
their excess quantity to the market. In bad weather years, these small farmers become net buyers 
of maize. Thus, demand for maize tends to shift outward in bad weather years and inward in good 
weather years. Consequently, the four different weather scenarios illustrated in table A.1 have to 
be considered separately. Since the model is designed to capture a shortage year, only data for 
bad weather years was used, leaving only four observations (1998, 2001, 2002, 2005). The data 
set is further limited by the unusually high traded quantity in 2005 and this outlier was ignored 
out of caution. 
 
  25Average price and quantity were calculated using the three remaining data points, and were 
considered to be the ‘representative’ outcome for a bad weather year. It is, of course, not possible 
to generate a complete demand function from a single data point. To do this, the representative 
observation was interpreted as the equilibrium outcome of a Cournot market game with the 
following assumptions: 
 
1.  There are four identical major traders who have jointly supplied 40 percent of the total 
quantity. The remaining 60 percent comes from non-strategic small traders.  
2.  The firms’ marginal costs (i.e. the producer prices) are 5/6 of the market price. The 
empirical gross profit margin of a trader is about 20 percent, so this was as a proxy for the 
unknown Cournot profits. 
3.  There is no government intervention.  
 
Assumptions (1) and (2) are conceptually dubious as they take as they take a constant variable as 
an input to estimate something that should be a variable endogenous output.  However, these 
assumptions are unlikely to distort the model outcomes drastically. The third assumption is more 
critical, since government intervention is typical for shortage years. Unfortunately, reliable data 
on government supplied quantities were not available. The direction of this distortion is also not 
obvious, since the effect of government supply on total quantity depends on the strategic reaction 
by the traders on expected government behavior.  
 
With these inputs one can search numerically for intercept and slope of the demand function that 
returns the observed prices and quantities as equilibrium outcomes. The demand function 
obtained for bad weather years is presented in the main text (equation 4). 
  26Appendix B. Instructions for the Experiment 
 
Thank you for coming to the experiment. In this experiment you will make decisions in a market 
environment. During the session it is not permitted to talk or communicate with the other 
participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk 
to answer it. During the session you will earn money. At the end of the session a show-up fee of 5 
euros plus the amount you will have earned during the experiment will be paid to you in cash. 
Payments are confidential, we will not inform any of the other participants of the amount you 
have earned. In the following, all amounts of money are denominated in talers, the experimental 
currency unit. 
 
During the experiment you will be paired with two other participants. You will be paired with the 
same two other participants throughout the experiment. You will not be informed of the identity 
of the person you are paired with. 
 
The experiment consists of six separate rounds. Each round follows the same structure described 
below.   
 
There are three active players in the market: Two Traders and the Government. Two of the three 
participants in a group will play the role of a Trader, the third participant will play the role of the 
Government. 
 
Decisions in a round 
Discretionary treatment:  
Each round consists of three stages. At stage 1 the Government announces a quantity he intends 
to supply at stage 2. At stage 2 the Traders and the Government choose the quantities they supply.   
 
Precommitment treatment:  
Each round consists of two stages. At stage 1 the Government chooses a quantity it supplies at 
stage 2. At stage 2 the Traders choose the quantities they supply.  
 
Stage 1 
Discretionary treatment:  
At stage 1 the Government announces how much of the commodity he intends to supply to the 
market at stage 2. It can choose a high quantity or a low quantity. The announcement is not 
binding, i.e. once stage 2 is reached the Government can choose a quantity different from the one 
announced.  
 
Precommitment treatment:  
The choice is binding, i.e. once stage 2 is reached the Government will supply the chosen 
quantity. The Traders are then informed about the quantity the Government has chosen. 
 
Stage 2 
At stage 2 the Traders simultaneously decide how much of the commodity to supply to the 
market. Each trader can choose a quantity between 20 and 80, in steps of 20. So the possible 
choices each Trader can make are 20, 40, 60 or 80. 
  
  27Discretionary treatment:   
At the same time the Government decides how much of the commodity to supply to the market. 
This can be the quantity announced at stage 1 or the other quantity. It can choose a high quantity 
or a low quantity.  
 
Precommitment treatment:  
The above paragraph was omitted. 
 
Payoffs 
All payoffs are denominated in talers, the fictitious experimental currency. 
 
The Traders’ and the Government’s payoffs are determined by the total quantity supplied by the 
Traders and the Government. The total quantity is the sum of the two Traders’ quantities plus the 
Government’s quantity. The total quantity determines the sales price for the commodity on sale, 
and hence, together with a trader’s quantity choice, the profit. The Government’s payoff 
represents the extent to which the Government meets its objectives. All payoffs have been 
calculated on the basis of a theoretical market model. 
 
You need not calculate any payoffs. A Trader’s payoffs, for all quantities chosen by the Traders 
and the Government are listed in the Trader’s Payoff Tables. There are two payoff tables for the 
Traders. The upper table shows a Trader’s payoff for the case that the Government chooses a low 
quantity. The table below shows a Trader’s payoff for the case that the Government chooses a 
high quantity. The Governor’s payoffs, for all possible total quantities of the two Traders are 
listed in The Government’s Payoff Table.  
 
Note that the two traders are identical in the set of their options and the corresponding payoffs. 
 
End of a round 
After stage 2 has ended, the payoffs for all players are calculated and all participants are informed 




At the start of the experiment you have a starting capital of 2000 talers, to which gains are added 
and losses are subtracted. At the end of the session talers are converted into euros at an exchange 
rate of one Euro for 500 talers. In addition, a show-up fee of EUR 5 is paid to each participant. 
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Appendix C. Results of the Workshop Experiment 
 
















1 High  20 20 Low  2,763  2,763  913 
2 Low  40 80 Low  2,357  4,715  1,705 
3 Low  60 60 Low  3,536  3,536  1,705 
Pre-commitment treatment 
4 Not  applicable  40  60  Low  3,149  4,724  1,507 
5 Not  applicable  60  60  Low  3,536  3,536  1,705 
 
 
















1 Low  60 40  High  -1,722  -1,148  2,122 
2 High  20 40 High  218  436  1,726 
3 Low  60 40  High  -1,722  -1,148  2,122 
Pre-commitment treatment 
4 Not  applicable  20  20  High  614  614  1,528 
5 Not  applicable  20  20  High  614  614  1,528 
 